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EMPLOYEE VIOLENCE, NEGLIGENT
HIRING, AND CRIMINAL RECORDS
CHECKS: NEW YORK'S NEED TO
REEVALUATE ITS PRIORITIES TO
PROMOTE PUBLIC SAFETY
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, violence has become a major concern in the
American workplace.1 All too often, we hear reports of employ-
ees "snapping" and assaulting co-workers and members of the
public.2 To help reduce this problem, New York recognizes the
negligent hiring cause of action.3 In this proceeding, an employer
' The extensive media coverage of high-profile incidents of employee violence,
such as the hostage standoff in a Denver postal station on Christmas Eve, 1997, re-
flects the public's growing concern regarding workplace violence. See, e.g., Martha
Bellisle, Ex-Postal Worker Ends Standoff, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 25, 1997, at A3; Lat-
est Postal Incident Ends Peacefully After Standoff, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 25, 1997, at 3.
This attention has not become focused without reason. According to the U.S. De-
partment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, over one thousand people are killed
at their places of employment annually. Between 1992 and 1996, five thousand one
hundred and forty six people were murdered at work. See BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NATIONAL CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES 1992-1996 (1996). In 1995 alone, 22,956 people were violently assaulted at
work. See id.
In addition to the toll workplace violence takes on human life, it has become a
significant concern for American business. According to one recent survey, the ag-
gregate cost of workplace violence is approximately $4.2 billion per year, after con-
sideration of lost wages, production, and medical costs. See Occupational Health &
Safety Letter, November 11, 1996 at 1; see also Janet E. Goldberg, Employees with
Mental and Emotional Problems-Workplace Security and Implications of State
Discrimination Laws, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act,
Workers' Compensation, and Related Issues, 24 STETSON L. REV. 201 (1994) (esti-
mating that 750 people were murdered and over 110,000 acts of violence were com-
mitted in the American workplace in 1992).
2 See infra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (outlining requirements for es-
tablishment of the negligent hiring cause of action). There are several sub-
categories within the realm of negligent hiring, such as negligent retention, negli-
gent supervision, and negligent training. However, for purposes of convenience, all
will be referred to as "negligent hiring." The "analysis of negligent retention [and
the other categories] is similar to negligent hiring but differs only with respect to
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may be found liable for harmful acts committed by an employee
if the employer knew, or should have known, of the employee's
predisposition for such behavior.4 While liability is most often
based on the employer's actual knowledge of an employee's
harmful predispositions, employers in New York have no duty to
acquire such knowledge by investigating the criminal records of
job applicants. 5  This remains true, despite the fact that over
forty-five percent of released felons are convicted again within
three years.6
To promote public safety, this Note proposes that employers
be required to ascertain the criminal histories of job applicants
so as to reveal any proclivity for violence. Such a requirement,
however, would impose a significant burden on the business
community.7 As a concession, a cap on damages in negligent
when the employer knew or should have known that an employee was a danger" to
others. Ronald A. Gray and Teri Wood, Employees at Risk, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 31, 1994,
at S1 (emphasis added).Violence is not the only type of behavior addressed by negligent hiring cases.
For example, in Weiss v. Furniture in the Raw, 306 N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 (Civ. Ct.
1969), an employer was found liable when an employee stole property from the
house of a customer.
5 An employer may be expected to inquire into a criminal history if the em-
ployee or applicant exhibits behavior that would raise suspicion of a violent predis-
position, such as excessive rudeness or antisocial behavior. See Corbally v. Sikras
Realty Co., 554 N.Y.S.2d 839, 839-40 (App. Div. 1990) (determining that an em-
ployer's failure to perform a more extensive background check may constitute ac-
tionable negligence where an awareness of employee's rudeness existed and where
the employee collected Nazi memorabilia and weapons). Hiring employees "off the
street" without references may also trigger a heightened duty to investigate. See
Weiss, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 255 ("An employer must also exercise reasonable care to de-
termine whether an employee is competent to perform ... without danger or harm
to [others]"); cf. Lazo v. Mal's Trading Co., 605 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273-74 (App. Div.
1993) (holding "off the street" workers to be independent contractors as a matter of
law), affd, 644 N.E.2d 1350 (1994).
6 Restrictions also exist in most other states. In addition, federal law limits the
use of both arrest and conviction records in the hiring process on the grounds that it
may violate Title VIIs prohibition of race discrimination under a disparate impact
theory. See, e.g., Green v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (8th Cir.
1975) (finding that the use of conviction records has disparate impact); Gregory v.
Litton Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1972) (determining that the use of
arrest records in hiring has an impermissible disparate impact on racial minorities
under the Civil Rights Act). However, at least one federal district, the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida, has rejected this rationale. See EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers,
Inc., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753-54 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (noting that use of criminal records
has a disparate impact on criminals, not racial groups). The Carolina Freight court
held that the criminal record inquiry has a good business justification in that an
employer has an interest in knowing the honesty of its workers. Id. at 754.
7 Requiring employers to obtain the criminal records of employees and appli-
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hiring cases involving ex-offenders should be set to protect em-
ployers from unlimited liability. Additionally, smaller employers
should be exempt from complying with the plan.
Part I of this Note discusses the menace of violence in the
workplace. Part II considers the relevance of recidivism rates as
indicative of the likelihood that an individual will commit a
crime. Part III reviews New York's current requirements for
employer liability under the negligent hiring theory. Part IV ex-
amines the New York statutes that restrict an employer's ability
to use criminal records in the hiring process. Finally, Part V
proposes a plan requiring certain employers to investigate the
criminal histories of job applicants.
I. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
In July 1997, a short-order cook was scolded in public by a
waitress for preparing a dish that was not on the menu.8 The
following day, the cook shot the waitress four times as she lay
huddled on the floor.9 In February 1993, a janitor did not receive
his $150 paycheck on time. When told that the bookkeeper could
not see him, he burst into her office, poured gasoline on her, and
set her on fire; she died hours later." In February 1988, Richard
Farley was fired from his job as a computer programmer for har-
assing a female co-worker." A few days later, he returned and
began a shooting spree that left seven co-workers dead and three
wounded.12 In April 1986, a California state worker shot his su-
cants would be both costly and time-consuming. In New York State, an individual's
criminal history may be obtained for a fee of $16.00 per county, with any search
taking two to three weeks. It is recognized that for the proposed plan to be practica-
ble, these charges and the time required would need to be reduced. To obtain more
information on obtaining criminal records, contact: Office of Court Administration,
25 Beaver Street, 8 Floor, New York, NY 10004, (212) 428-2810.
Additionally, some private companies provide nationwide services assisting
employers to obtain criminal histories. One such company is the Alexander Informa-
tion Group, which charges $30.00 per county in New York and promises information
within two days. For information on this company visit its website at
<http://www.alexinfogp.com>.
See David Kligman, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 25 1997, at B6.
See id.
'0 See Louis P. DiLorenzo, The Growing Menace: Violence in the Workplace, 67
N.Y. St. B.J. 24, 24 (1995) (discussing widespread implications of workplace vio-
lence).
" See id
12 See id.
1998]
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pervisor and then turned the gun on himself.3 The gunman left
behind a note: "'I hope this will alleviate a lot of stress from my
co-workers and set them free.' '"4 More recently, in March 1998,
a disgruntled Connecticut lottery employee shot himself and
three other high level executives. 5
In the American workplace, murder is the third largest
cause overall of on-the-job death, 6 and the leading cause of on-
the-job death for women. 7 Co-workers and former co-workers
commit fourteen percent of all workplace violence, 18 accounting
for nearly fifteen hundred violent assaults each year. 9 Further,
between 1992 and 1996, three hundred and thirty-six people
were murdered by co-workers or former co-workers." Some re-
searchers believe that statistics understate the actual number of
violent attacks and threats that occur in the workplace because
victims may fear retaliation for coming forward.21
II. EX-OFFENDER RECIDIVISM
A criminal history can be an accurate prognosticator of an
individual's likelihood to commit a crime. In the most recent
large-scale study of its kind, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
tracked the recidivism of sixteen thousand prisoners released in
3 See id.; see also De Tran, Slayings Latest in Workplace Assaults, L.A. TIMES,
July 9, 1993, at A26.
14 id.
15 See Liz Halloran, Workplace Violence: A Distant Fear Most Employees Feel
Safe At Their Jobs, But An Uneasy Feeling Remains-Courant / UConn Connecticut
Poll, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 24, 1998, at A3; Matthew Daly, Gun Control Meas-
ures Advance, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 24, 1998, at A3.
See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH, FATAL INJURIES TO WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-1989:
A DECADE OF SURVEILLANCE 8 (1993). See also John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Joseph-
son, Workplace Violence-Part II, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 1995, at 3 (discussing an em-
ployer's rights and obligations upon learning of the dangerous propensities of an
employee).
17 See Struggling to Understand Causes of Workplace Violence, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
17, 1993, at 1; see also Workplace Homicides: Most Workplace Homicide Victims Are
Male But Women Are Primary Targets of Assaults, O.S.H. Daily (BNA), May 23,
1995, at D2; Goldberg, supra note 1, at 201.
'8 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, CENSUS OF LABOR
STATISTICS CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES 1992-1996, (1996), Table P-5,
Table Y_
9 See id. at Table X.
20 See id. at Table P-5.
21 See Furfaro & Josephson, supra note 16, at 3.
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1983.22 Within three years, sixty-two percent were re-arrested
and forty-six percent were re-convicted. Of the violent felons'
released, fifty-nine percent were re-arrested and thirty-six per-
cent were re-convicted within the same period."
III. NEGLIGENT HIRING IN NEW YORK
New York recognizes the negligent hiring cause of action,27
which should be distinguished from respondeat superior.2 Un-
der the latter doctrine, employers may be found liable for harm
committed by employees acting within the scope of their em-
ployment.29 Negligent hiring, on the other hand, concerns the
causal link between the employer's negligence in hiring an indi-
vidual with known harmful propensities and the employee's sub-
sequent violent behavior. 0 Under this theory, an employer may
22 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT
- RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1997) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT].
See id. at 3. The United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics, maintains that re-arrest records are a more accurate gauge than either re-
conviction or re-incarceration records. Their rationale is that "not all offenders are
prosecuted or go to trial." Id. at 2. This report based findings on a sample of 16,000
prisoners released from eleven states during 1983. These states were: New York,
Florida, New Jersey, California, Texas, Oregon, Ohio, North Carolina, Illinois, Min-
nesota, and Michigan. See id. at 12. For more information on this report, or for in-
formation regarding the Bureau of Justice statistics, visit the Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics' website at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm.>.
24 See id. at3.
2 The Bureau of Justice Statistics categorizes "violent felonies" as: murder (in-
cluding intentional manslaughter), negligent manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, other
sexual assault, robbery, assault, and "other violent crimes." Id. at Table 3.
26 See id. at Table 8.
27 See infra notes 74-91, and accompanying text.
28 See Goldberg, supra note 1, at 215 ("The two theories... differ[1 primarily in
the timeframe in which the alleged negligence occurred and the degree of knowl-
edge.., of the employer."); see also Ronald M. Green, Negligent Hiring: An Emerg-
ing Theory of Employer Liability for Employee Misconduct, C334 ALI-ABA 907, 909
(1988) (stating that under a negligent hiring theory, an employer may be held liable
for employees acting outside the scope of employment, and even outside its hours of
employment).
29 See Goldberg, supra note 1, at 216 (stating requirements for liability under
the theory of respondeat superior).
2o See, e.g., Rosanne Lienhard, Negligent Retention of Employees: An Expanding
Doctrine, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 389, 389-90 (1996) (discussing development from the
restrictive fellow servant rule, to the more inclusive doctrine of respondeat superior,
to the modern theory of negligent hiring); see also Neal Miller, Criminal Convic-
tions, "Off-Duty Misconduct," and Federal Employment: The Need for Better Defini-
tion of the Basis for Disciplinary Action, 39 AM. L. REV. 869, 901 (1990) ("Unlike re-
spondeat superior's scope of employment analysis, the inquiry in negligent hiring
theory focuses on the causal link between the employer's negligence in hiring or
1998]
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be held liable for exposing foreseeable victims to employees who
were known, or with a reasonable investigation would have been
known, to pose a risk of harm to others."'
To establish a negligent hiring cause of action, a plaintiff
must first show that the employer owed him or her a duty of
care.3 2  In deciding whether such a duty exists, the courts first
determine whether the plaintiff was a member of a class of fore-
seeable victims.3 Such individuals typically include co-workers
and members of the public that the employee would be expected
to encounter.' Additionally, the plaintiff must show that 1) the
person who committed the harmful act was, in fact, employed by
the defendant; 2) the employer knew or should have known that
the employee was potentially dangerous; 3) the employer's negli-
gence in hiring the employee proximately caused the plaintiffs
injury; and 4) the plaintiff was, in fact, injured.35
failing to supervise employees with criminal records and the subsequent actions of
that employee.").3' See Miller, supra note 30, at 902 ("Employer liability for negligent hiring is
based upon the reasonableness of the hiring... [tlhe reasonableness of the hiring
must therefore depend upon the existence of any nexus between the applicant's
prior conviction record and the potential threat to public safety that the job position
could create.") (citation omitted).
32 See Mark Minuti, Note, Employer Liability Under the Doctrine of Negligent
Hiring: Suggested Methods for Avoiding the Hiring of Dangerous Employees, 13
DEL. J. CORP. L. 501, 509 (1988).
"See Haddock v. City of New York, 553 N.E.2d 987, 992 (N.Y. 1990) (discussing
the foreseeability that a park employee with a rape conviction would have unsuper-
vised contact with children in the park); see also Caldwell v. Village of Island Park,
107 N.E.2d 441, 443-44 (N.Y. 1952) (stating that defendant's duty to use care is
premised on the likelihood of harm to others); Sadowski v. Long Island R.R. Co., 55
N.E.2d 497, 500 (N.Y. 1944) ("Ordinary care must be in proportion to the danger to
be avoided and the consequences that might reasonably be anticipated from the ne-
glect."); Talbert v. Talbert, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212, 216 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (holding an af-
firmative act may create a duty of care imposing liability if the response causing
injury is a foreseeable one); Luneau v. Elmwood Gardens, Inc., 198 N.Y.S.2d 932,
935-36 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (imposing liability where an employer specifically directed an
employee to use materials that he knew or should have known were defective).
Employers, however, will not face liability if it was unforseeable that the vic-
tim would have come into contact with the employee. See, e.g., Baugher v. A. Hat-
tersley & Sons, Inc., 436 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind. 1982) (rejecting employer liability
when an employee with a known criminal record raped a waitress away from the
workplace and not during work hours).
See Minuti, supra note 32, at 509; see also Marianne Jeannette Schmitt, Note,
9 U. BALT. L. REV. 435, 441-42 (1980) (enumerating requirements for establishment
of a prima facie case of negligent hiring). See generally Cindy M. Haerle, Note, Em-
ployer Liability for the Criminal Acts of Employees Under Negligent Hiring Theory:
Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1308 (1984) (listing requi-
site elements for a negligent hiring cause of action); Harry H. Lipsig, Negligent Hir-
[Vol. 72:581
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Negligent hiring cases may be divided into three categories.
The first category consists of cases in which the courts have
found that employers were unaware of their employees' harmful
propensities.36 The second consists of cases in which employers
had actual knowledge of their employees' harmful propensities
and failed to take adequate precautions to protect the public?
7
The last category includes cases in which courts have found that,
through a reasonable inquiry, employers should have known of
their employees' criminal propensities.38
1. Employers Unaware of Predisposition
Employers are often relieved of liability for negligent hiring
on the grounds that they were not aware of an employee's pre-
disposition for harmful behavior.39 Employers have a duty to
perform an "adequate investigation," as determined by the par-
ticular job.4" The scope of such an investigation is a question of
law, while the determination of whether an employer fulfilled its
ing and Retention, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 1991, at 3 (discussing a plaintiffs burden in
showing a breach of duty in negligent hiring).
3' See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 64-91 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
39 In general, no inquiry into an applicant's or employee's criminal record is re-
quired, "provided the employer makes adequate inquiry concerning the employee's
fitness or otherwise has a sufficient basis to rely on the employee, even when it is
known that the employee is to regularly deal with members cf the public." See
Green, supra note 28, at 917; see also Gallo v. Dugan, 645 N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (App. Div.
1996) (determining employer not liable because plaintiff failed to establish "that the
employee had a history of, or propensity for, assaultive behavior and that even if
such was proven, that plaintiff knew or should have known of such propensity");
Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793 (App.
Div.) ("[A] necessary element of [negligent hiring liability] is that the employer
knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct which
caused the injury.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 413 (1997); Mataxas
v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 621 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (App. Div. 1995) ("[Tlhere is no
evidence in the record to indicate that the hospital had any knowledge of the [tort-
feasor's] propensity to commit the alleged acts. Accordingly, the third cause of ac-
tion for damages for the hospital's negligent hiring of... the technician [tortfeasor]
should have been dismissed.") (citing Detone v. Bullit Courier Serv., 528 N.Y.S.2d
575 (App. Div. 1988)); Rochlin v. Alamo, 619 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (App. Div. 1994)
("[There was no evidence to warrant the inference that the defendant... should
have known that its employee.., was potentially dangerous; therefore, there was
no negligence on its part in hiring the employee.") (citations omitted).
40 While these parameters may not initially include the determination of a
criminal record at the point of application, employers may face liability if they
"learn of an employee's criminal record and fail[] to investigate further to determine
whether the employee poses a safety risk." Goldberg, supra note 1, at 217.
1998]
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duty is decided by a finder of fact.41 However, it remains clear
that the duty to perform an adequate investigation does not
normally extend to criminal record checks."
In Detone v. Bullit Courier Service, Inc.,43 a bicycle messen-
ger, Emerson, knocked into the plaintiff, Detone, while making a
delivery.44 Detone swung his bag at Emerson, who responded by
striking him in the head. This blow knocked Detone unconscious
and caused severe physical injuries, including permanent neu-
rological damage.45 Detone sought damages from the assailant's
employer, Bullit, alleging liability based on the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior and negligent hiring.4 6  The trial court
awarded damages to Detone on the negligent hiring claim.47
The Appellate Division reversed, noting that "[niothing ad-
duced at trial indicated that Emerson had a history of or propen-
sity for violence, much less was there evidence that [defendant]
had any knowledge that its employee might be dangerous." 8 Al-
though Emerson had been fired twice in the past, there was no
record that either discharge was due to violent behavior.4 9 With-
out a concrete indication of the messenger's history of violence,
the court found that the employer had not been put on notice
and, therefore, could not be found liable for negligent hiring."
New York courts have steadfastly maintained that, barring
unusual circumstances that would put employers on notice to
delve more deeply, employers are under no obligation to uncover
41 See Ford v. Gildin, 613 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (App. Div. 1994) ("Whether this
screening and Mr. Taylor's retention was reasonable under the circumstances is a
factual question for the jury.").
42 See Kenneth R., 654 N.Y.S.2d at 795; Ford, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 142 (holding the
imposition of liability for failure to check criminal records to be contrary to the pub-
lic policy of reintegration into society); Stevens v. Lankard, 297 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688
(App. Div. 1968) (holding a "routine check" is sufficient; a more exhaustive search
would lead to 'unfair burdens" on the business community), affd, 254 N.E.2d 339
(N.Y. 1969); Amendolara v. Macy's New York, 241 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (App. Div. 1963)
(stating that there is no duty to inquire into the possibility of conviction of past
crimes exists).
528 N.Y.S.2d 575 (App. Div. 1988).
Id. at 576.
46 See id.
46 See id.
41 See id. The jury awarded the plaintiff $190,000 in damages, and awarded his
wife $50,000 on her derivative claim. See id.
48 id.
4 See id.
See id. at 577.
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the criminal records of applicants or employees." In Amendolara
v. Macy's New York,5 the Appellate Division held that an em-
ployer could not be found liable for negligent hiring:
[Defendant] was under no duty to inquire into the possibility
that [its employee] might have been convicted of crime in the
past, and before the incident in question nothing transpired to
alert it to the possibility that such an incident might occur.0
The courts appear to believe that requiring employers to
check criminal records would be unduly burdensome. In Stevens
v. Lankard," a store clerk sodomized a child customer. Four
years prior to this incident, the employee had been convicted of
sodomy in Pittsburgh.55 His employer, however, was unaware of
his criminal history, and nothing in the employee's demeanor in-
dicated that his background should be more closely scrutinized. 5
The court held that the employer could not be found liable:
[T]here was no evidence which warranted the inference that ap-
pellants knew, or should have known, of the employee Lank-
ard's proclivities. A routine check into the man's background
would never have revealed his prior sodomy conviction in Pitts-
burgh. To require any more exhaustive search into an em-
ployee's background would place an unfair burden on the busi-
ness community.
More recently, in Ford v. Gildin,"8 the Appellate Division,
First Department, held that the owners of an apartment building
could not be found liable when a porter they had hired, who had
a criminal record (including a manslaughter conviction), sexually
abused a young girl living in one of their apartments.59 The court
noted that even if the defendants had known of their employee's
criminal history, the causal link between knowledge of the man-
slaughter conviction and the subsequent abuse was insufficient
51 See Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791
(App. Div.) (stating "[tlhere is no common-law duty to institute specific procedures
for hiring employees unless the employer knows of facts that would lead a reasona-
bly prudent person to investigate the prospective employee"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
413 (1997).
52 241 N.Y.S.2d 39 (App. Div. 1963).
3Id. at 40.
'4 297 N.Y.S.2d 686 (App. Div. 1968), affd, 254 N.E.2d 339 (N.Y. 1969).
"See id. at 687.
See id. at 688.
7 id.
"613 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. Div. 1994).
"Id. at 139-140.
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to find the employer liable.0
The court, restated the duties employers must fulfill in the
hiring process.6' The defendants did not violate "their own pro-
cedures regarding employment of individuals with criminal rec-
ords."62 Additionally, they had no legal duty to inquire into their
employee's criminal history.'
2. Employers With Actual Knowledge of Predisposition for
Harmful Behavior
New York courts will, however, hold employers liable for
placing employees that are known to be violent in positions in
which they can harm others.' In the landmark decision Had-
dock v. City of New York,65 the Court of Appeals found New York
City liable for employing a violent offender in its Parks Depart-
ment.6 The employee, James Johnson, had previously been con-
victed of attempted rape and other violent crimes.67 The city had
employed him to work closely with children in a playground and
with very little supervision.68
60 See id. at 140. The court reasoned that, even if the apartment owners were
negligent in hiring the porter in 1964, the hiring could not have been the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury, which occurred 18 years later. See id. Alternatively, the
court referred to the plaintiff mother's friendship with the porter and the defen-
dant's unsupervised visits with the plaintiff as "independent and unforseeable in-
tervening events which... severed the causal nexus between the two events." Id.
(citations omitted).
61 See id. at 140-41.
Id. at 140.
See id. (citing Amendolara v. Macy's New York, 241 N.Y.S.2d 39 (App. Div.
1963)).
6 See, e.g., Haddock, 553 N.E.2d at 987; Hall v. Smathers, 148 N.E. 654 (N.Y.
1925); McCrink v. City of New York, 71 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1947); 146 Siler v. Mon-
tegue Associates, 652 N.Y.S.2d 315 (App. Div. 1997); Rhames v. Supermarkets Gen-
eral Corp., 646 N.Y.S.2d 622 (App. Div. 1996).
553 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1990).
See id. at 992.
"See id. at 990. Johnson's criminal history consisted of assault, robbery in the
second degree, grand larceny in the first degree, conspiracy to escape prison,
breaking and entering, fighting, and hoboing. See id. In addition to these convic-
tions, Johnson had been arrested for rape, assault, and use of a dangerous instru-
ment. See id.
See id. at 989. Participants in the program were assigned to one of three job
categories: clerical, human services, or utility work. As a utility worker, Johnson's
position was described as follows: "Under close supervision performs simple routine
tasks necessary for the operation and maintenance of city department facilities and
performs related work." Id. In reality, Johnson was usually under no supervision in
the park; he was under the supervision of a district foreman, "who visited the 25 or
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Johnson was hired pursuant to the Work Relief Employment
Program, which required employable welfare recipients to work
for the city in exchange for receiving benefits. 9 The city's inter-
nal policy required that the Department of Personnel ascertain
the criminal record of each recipient before placement for work
in one of the city's various departments.70 A record, no matter
how egregious, was not grounds for classifying an individual as
"unemployable." It was, however, a factor to be considered in de-
termining the particular individual's work assignment.71
The city became aware of Johnson's violent criminal history
in January 1979. Three months later, he lured nine year old
Yvonne Haddock into a workshed and repeatedly raped her for
over two hours. The court stated that the city could not be ex-
cused from failing to comply "with its own procedures requiring
informed discretion in the placement of individuals with criminal
records."2 The city had exposed itself to liability by informing
itself of the criminal records of the employee.73
Similarly, liability for negligent hiring was premised on an
employer's actual knowledge of an employee's violent propensi-
ties in one of New York's earliest negligent hiring cases,
McCrink v. City of New York.74 In 1947, an intoxicated off-duty
police officer shot two men, killing one and seriously wounding
the other.75 The Court of Appeals determined that the city could
be held responsible because, through its internal disciplinary
procedures, the city had become aware of the officer's excessive
drinking and "vicious propensities."76
In 1984, Kenneth Robinson, an off-duty Department of Cor-
rectional Services officer, shot a puppy named "Princess" for
more parks under his jurisdiction several times weekly, for five or ten minutes
each." Id.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See id.
2 Id. at 992.
73 The court noted that there was no indication that the city attempted to com-
ply with its own policy regarding "personnel procedures for employees with criminal
records, and no indication that it made a judgment of any sort when it learned that
[the employee] both had a criminal record and lied egregiously about it." Id. at 991.
74 71 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1947).
75 See id.
78 Id. at 420-21. The causation requirement for a negligent hiring action was
satisfied because police officers were required to carry firearms at all times, includ-
ing while off-duty. See id. at 421.
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barking too loudly.17 When Princess' owner, Hector Marquez,
confronted him, Robinson responded, "I going [sic] to shoot you
too."78 The police soon arrived, but did not arrest Robinson after
he displayed his correction officer's badge.79 The following day,
Marquez notified the Department of Correctional Services of the
incident and was told an investigation would be made." Appar-
ently accepting Robinson's account that the puppy had attacked
him, and in violation of the Department's own rules, a full inves-
tigation was never performed.8 Robinson was not suspended
and his privilege to carry a pistol while off-duty was not re-
voked.
2
Two years later, Robinson shot and wounded two men fol-
lowing a traffic collision.' After shooting one of the men in the
hip and one in the abdomen, Robinson approached and kicked
one of them in the head.' Despite his assertion that the two
men had attacked him, the only injury found on Robinson was a
bruised right foot.' After a bifurcated non-jury trial, the city
was found not liable.85
Citing Haddock, the Appellate Division reversed the trial
court's dismissal and remanded the case.87 The court noted that
the Department of Correctional Services had failed to comply
with its own disciplinary rules.' The court added that "such
omission cannot be cured by later supposition that, had a proper
investigation been made of the 1984 incident, the employee's
status would have remained unchanged."89
The above cases demonstrate that employers may be held li-
able for placing employees that are known to be violent in con-
tact with the public. However, they are not representative of
See Wyatt v. State, 575 N.Y.S.2d 31, 32 (App. Div. 1991).78 Id. at 32.
See id. at 32-33.
See id. at 33.
"' See id. The Department of Corrections did not investigate Marquez's com-
plaint until one and a half years later. See id. The file was subsequently closed and
no disciplinary action was ever taken. See id.
nSee id.
8See id.
See id. at 32.
See id.
See id.
"See id. at 34.
"See id.
&Id. (citing Haddock, 553 N.E.2d 987).
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most negligent hiring cases. In McCrink and Haddock, the city
became aware of their employees' criminal propensities through
internal procedures." Most employers, however, do not have
similar procedures because they are not legally required to as-
certain the criminal records of applicants or employees.9' As
demonstrated by the case law discussed supra, in Section 1, em-
ployers actually have a strong incentive not to search out such
criminal records because ignorance may be used as a shield
against subsequent liability.
3. Employer "Should Have Known"
The final category of employer liability for an employee's
violent actions could perhaps better be labeled as an exception to
the general rules. Virtually every negligent hiring opinion reit-
erates that employers can be found liable for negligent hiring if
they knew or "should have known" of an employee's criminal
propensities.92 Seemingly, an employee's or applicant's back-
ground must be scrutinized more closely than usual if facts are
present that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investi-
gate further.93
In contrast to the repeated admonitions in dictum, however,
the courts virtually never find employers liable because they
"should have known" of an employee's harmful propensities.'
Haddock, 553 N.E.2d at 990; McCrink, 71 N.E.2d at 421.
91 See, e.g., Ford v. Gilden, 613 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (App. Div. 1994) (stating that
the events leading to the defendant's misconduct were unforseeable and independ-
ent intervening acts which severed the causal nexus between the two events);
Amendolara v. Macy's New York, 241 N.Y.S.2d 39 40 (App. Div. 1963) ("We find no
evidence in the record from which a jury could reasonably infer negligence on the
part of defendant ... in the hiring or supervision of [the tortfeasor]. It was under no
duty to inquire into the possibility that [the tortfeasor] might have been convicted of
crime in the past .... ).
92 See, e.g., Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d
791, 793 (App. Div.)(stating that in order to find an employer vicariously liable for
its employee's torts, the employer must have known or should have known of the
employee's dangerous propensities), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 413 (1997); Detone v.
Bullit Courier Serv., Inc., 528 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (App. Div. 1988) (discussing plain-
tiffs contention that the employer knew or should have known of the employee's
dangerous propensities).
See Green, supra note 28, at 917. "[Sluspicious factors such as short residency
periods, gaps in employment, or admissions of prior criminal convictions, are re-
vealed in the employment application or in interviews with the applicant, a reason-
able employer would be put on notice to make further inquiries into the applicant's
background, including his or her criminal record." Id.
94 See Ford, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 140; Amendolara, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
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Among New York negligent hiring cases Corbally v. Sikras Re-
alty Co.5 appears to be unique. In Corbally, a tenant brought a
personal injury action for harm alleged to have been caused by
the superintendent." The employer's defense was lack of notice.
The court, however, held that whether the defendants should
have been aware of their employee's propensity for violence be-
cause he exhibited aggressively rude behavior and displayed an
affinity for Nazi memorabilia, was a question of fact for the
jury.97 The court remanded the case for a determination on that
issue.
The Corbally holding is notable for its rarity. As perhaps
the lone example of negligent hiring liability premised on the
"should have known" prong, its rarity demonstrates that actual
knowledge is virtually required for finding employer liability.98
Further, it displays the high standard that must be met for
finding that an employer "should have known" of an employee's
harmful predisposition;99 the employer was only considered "on
notice" after the superintendent outwardly displayed bizarre be-
havior.0 °
Summary
The three categories above help flesh out New York's re-
quirements for finding employer liability in a negligent hiring
cause of action. Liability may be found if the employer had
"knowledge" of an employee's propensity for harmful behavior.
Case law reflects that this must almost always consist of actual
knowledge."1 However, employers are under no legal duty to ob-
tain actual knowledge, in the form of criminal records. Instead,
employers are effectively discouraged from making such investi-
gations because actual knowledge may lead to liability, as dem-
onstrated in Haddock and McCrink.
0 2
95 554 N.Y.S.2d 839 (App. Div. 1990).
96 Id. at 839-840.
:7 See id. at 840.
See id. at 839-40.
See id. at 839 (discussing the factual questions which need to be addressed
concerning the employee's prior employment and the circumstances surrounding his
termination there).
'00 See id. at 840.
1'0 See, e.g., Amendolora, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 40 (stating that employer was under
no duty to inquire into the possibility that employee might have been convicted of a
crime in the past).
'02 See Haddock v. New York, 553 N.E.2d 987, 992 (N.Y. 1990); McCrink v. City
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IV. EX-OFFENDER PROTECTION STATUTES
New York public policy supports hiring ex-offenders in ap-
propriate situations.' This partiality on the side of rehabilita-
tion has influenced negligent hiring decisions." For example, in
the aforementioned Ford v. Gildin,0 5 the Appellate Division
noted its concern that a finding of liability would have a "chilling
effect"' on the willingness of other employers to hire ex-
offenders:..7
Such a precedent would effectively compel any employer to deny
employment to anyone who was ever convicted of a violent
crime, contrary to the public policy stated in article 23-A of the
Correction Law, since the employer would upon such hiring face
potentially catastrophic liability for any crime committed by
that employee which was even minimally connected to the place
of New York, 71 N.E.2d 419, 422 (N.Y. 1947). Another potential cause for employer
liability involves situations where an applicant's history should be more carefully
investigated due to the nature of the job. In Weiss v. Furniture in the Raw, 306
N.Y.S.2d 253 (Civ. Ct. 1969), a retailer hired delivery people "off the street" and on a
temporary basis. Id. at 254. When one of their employees stole from a customer's
home while making a delivery, the employer was found liable for negligent hiring.
See id. The court held that the employer should have performed a more extensive
background check due to the transient nature of the employment. See id. at 254-55.
However, the validity of this lower court decision is questionable following the Ap-
pellate Division's decision in Lazo v. Mak's Trading Co., 605 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1993).
There, three men, known only by their first names, were hired temporarily to un-
load trucks at the defendant's grocery store. See id. at 273. On one such occassion,
one of the laborers assaulted an operator of the tractor trailer as he delivered goods
to the store. See id. However, the court found that the employee was an independent
contractor, and as such, the employer could not be held responsible. See id. at 274.
Therefore, the reason for finding liability in Weiss-the transient nature of the job-
was deemed by the Appellate Division as grounds for a finding of no employer li-
ability. See id. at 274.
1 See, e.g., Eiseman v. State, 511 N.E.2d 1128, 1132 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that a
prisoner's release by the state did not constitute negligence as a matter of law).
'" See Ford v. Gilden, 613 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142 (App. Div. 1994) (noting its concern
that a finding of liability would have a "chilling effect" on the willingness of other
employers to hire ex-offenders); see also Haddock, 553 N.E.2d at 992 (discussing the
importance of a municipal employer's compliance with its own procedures requiring
informed discretion in the placement of individuals with criminal records).
"5 See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
'06 Ford, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
107 See Haddock, 553 N.E.2d at 992 ('The importance of employing former in-
mates, and reintegrating them into society, without risk of absolute liability for
those who open doors to them, cannot be overstated."); Ford, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 142
("Imposing liability upon an employer under the circumstances presented herein
would have an unacceptably chilling effect on society's efforts to reintegrate ex-
offenders into mainstream society, contrary to precedent and the explicitly stated
public policy of this State.").
1998]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of his employment."
New York has given statutory life to its public policy
through Article 23-A, sections 750 through 753 of the Correction
Law,"9 which is also referred to by Executive Law sections
296(15) and 296(16).110 Article 23-A limits the ability of employ-
ers and state licensing agencies to use the criminal records of
applicants. The purpose of this law is not to give ex-offenders
preferred treatment in the hiring process, but to reduce em-
ployer prejudice."' According to former Governor Hugh Carey,
who signed Article 23-A into law in 1976, an inability to find
work due to a bias against offenders contributed to a high rate of
recidivism.12  Notably, Governor Carey pointed out that while
the law attempted to remove the stigma of ex-offender status, it
"in no way require[d] the hiring of former offenders.""3
Article 23-A is a general rule that bars employers and public
agencies from denying employment or a license, solely based on
one's ex-offender status."4 However, the statute recognizes two
exceptions. The first occurs where there is a "direct relation-
ship" between the prior criminal offense and the specific em-
ployment or license sought."5 A direct relationship is defined as
one in which the "nature of criminal conduct for which the per-
son was convicted has a direct bearing on his fitness or ability to
perform one or more of the duties or responsibilities necessarily
related to the license or employment sought.""6
'08 Ford, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
,09 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 750-53 (McKinney 1987).
"o See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(15)-(16) (McKinney 1993).
... While offenders were encouraged to find employment after release from
prison, their criminal records caused great difficulty in gaining employment. This
was often the case despite there being no connection between the job or license and
the crime committed. See Michael Meltsner, et al., An Act to Promote the Rehabilita-
tion of Criminal Offenders in the State of New York, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 885, 904-
05 (1973) (discussing the "direct relationship" test).
.. See 1996 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 49-50 (McKinney 1976).
"3 See Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 931, 1976 N.Y. Laws (July
27, 1976), reprinted in 1976 N.Y. Laws at 2458-59; 1976 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. at 417-18.
114 See Peluso v. Smith, 540 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (Sup. Ct. 1989) ("The purpose of
Correction Law Article 23-A... was not to give ex-convicts preferred treatment, but
to try to remove prejudice against former criminals obtaining jobs or licenses. Such
prejudice, according to research, was not only widespread, but unfair and counter-
productive."); see also Eiseman v. State, 511 N.E.2d 1128, 1132-33 (N.Y. 1987) (dis-
cussing the strong public policy favoring rehabilitation of ex-convicts).
115 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752(1).
116 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 750(3).
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Additionally, section 753 of Article 23-A provides eight fac-
tors to assist employers in determining whether a "direct rela-
tionship" exists between a particular applicant's prior criminal
record and the employment position sought: (1) the public policy
of New York to encourage the employment of persons previously
convicted of one or more criminal offenses; (2) the specific duties
of the job; (3) the bearing, if any, the criminal offense or offenses
will have on the applicant's fitness to perform such duties; (4)
the time elapsed since the conviction; (5) the age of the job appli-
cant at the time of the offense; (6) the seriousness of the offense
or offenses; (7) any information in regard to the applicant's reha-
bilitation and good conduct; and (8) the safety and welfare of
specific individuals or the general public."
Article 23-A also provides a second exception to the general
rule prohibiting the use of an ex-offender's criminal record to
deny employment. Employers". may reject an applicant if his or
her employment would create an "unreasonable risk" to persons
or property."' Unlike the "direct relation" exception, what con-
stitutes an "unreasonable risk" is not defined, but instead must
be determined on a case-by-case basis.2 However, some courts
have noted that the eight factors used in determining a direct
relation are also useful in finding an "unreasonable risk." 2'
1. Cases Finding Denial of Employment Appropriate Under
Article 23-A
Article 23-A has been used to deny ex-offenders employment
or licenses necessary for employment. For example, in Grafer v.
New York City Civil Service Commission," a man with drunk-
driving convictions applied for a position with the New York City
Fire Department." Considering the responsibilities of the posi-
tion sought, the Appellate Division upheld the department's re-
117 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753(1).
118 Note that the statute also applies to New York State licensing agencies.
Cases interpreting Article 23-A usually involve licensing, cases involving private
employers are rare. This is presumably because, at present, private employers never
become aware of their applicants' criminal records. On the other hand, state licens-
ing agencies require more extensive background checks.
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752(2).
120 See Bonacorsa v. Van LAndt, 523 N.E.2d 806, 810 (N.Y. 1988).
121 See id.
122 581 N.Y.S.2d 337 (App. Div. 1992).
1'2 Id. at 337.
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jection of his application, concluding that: "petitioner's prior of-
fenses are such as to involve an unreasonable risk to property,
and to the safety and welfare of the general public.""
In another case, the New York State Racing and Wagering
Board denied a horse owner-trainer-driver's petition for rein-
statement of a racing license because he had been convicted of
falsely testifying "to cover up for another who he knew had been
barred from horseracing."'" Noting that the horseracing indus-
try was heavily regulated, the Board considered denial necessary
to prevent the appearance of impropriety.1 26 The Court of Ap-
peals agreed with this decision, holding that the applicant's con-
victions bore a "direct relationship" to the license sought.
127
These cases illustrate that employers may refuse to hire ex-
offenders and remain in compliance with Article 23-A. Employ-
ers are expected to weigh an applicant's criminal record in the
decision-making process when such information is known or
should be known.'28 If, after considering the relationship be-
tween a conviction and the job, an employer believes that the ap-
plicant is unsuitable for the position, employment may be re-
fused.9 However, without knowledge of an applicant's criminal
history, there may be no opportunity for employers to make use
of the available balancing scheme.3 '
2. Cases Finding Denial Inappropriate Under Article 23-A
Courts may determine that an employer's decision to deny
an applicant employment based upon a criminal history was in-
appropriate. 31  In Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil Service
124 Id.
125 Bonacorsa, 523 N.E.2d at 811; see also Glucksman v. Cuomo, 403 N.Y.S.2d
328 (App. Div. 1978) (denying petitioner's application for real estate broker's license
was warranted by a determination that there was a direct relationship between pe-
titioner's criminal offenses and the license sought).
126 See Bonacorsa, 523 N.E.2d. at 811 (citing Casse v. New York State Racing &
Wagering Bd., 517 N.E.2d 1309 (N.Y. 1987); see also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64
(1979).
127 See Bonacorsa, 523 N.E.2d. at 811.
128 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
'2 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752.
20 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753(c). The statute assumes knowledge of criminal
history in order to employ the balancing test. See id.
231 See, e.g., Peluso v. Smith, 540 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (stating that
the purpose of Correction Law 23-A is not to give ex-offenders an advantage, or to
cloak records, but to remove unproductive bias).
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Commission," 2 the Southern District of New York applied New
York law in determining whether a job applicant was wrongfully
refused employment. 3 While this action was brought in federal
court, the case has since been favorably cited by New York
courts."34
Soto-Lopez applied to the Civil Service Commission for a po-
sition as a caretaker with the New York City Housing Author-
ity.135 When asked on his application form if he had been con-
victed in the past, he answered that he had not."6 He did have a
criminal record, however, including convictions for manslaughter
and criminal possession of a controlled substance."7 Through its
internal procedures, the Civil Service Commission became aware
of Soto-Lopez's record and denied employment.13 The district
court held that this denial violated Article 23-A.' 39
As discussed above, New York Correction Law section 752
prohibits denial of employment solely on the basis of an appli-
cant's prior conviction. " One exception arises if "there is a di-
rect relationship between one or more of the previous criminal
offenses and the specific... employment sought." The district
court weighed Soto-Lopez's manslaughter conviction against the
responsibilities of the caretaker position sought,' and concluded
that tasks such as sweeping and mopping floors, changing light
bulbs, and washing windows did not bear a direct relationship to
his prior conviction.' 3
122 713 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
3 See id. at 678-79.
"" This case has been cited favorably by the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment. For example, in Ford v. Gildin, 613 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (App. Div. 1994), where
the court commended Judge Owen's "cogent analysis of the issue[s]."
" See Soto-Lopez, 713 F. Supp. at 678.
136 See id.
'3 See id. ("Plaintiff was convicted of manslaughter in 1973, at which time he
had no prior criminal history.... In 1984, plaintiff was arrested for criminal pos-
session of a narcotic drug with intent to sell and for criminal possession of a con-
trolled substance; he was sentenced to a three-year probation term following a
guiltr plea in February of 1984.").See id.
"9 See id. at 679 (applying section 753 unreasonable risk factors and finding
"the city's refusal to hire [Soto-Lopez] at this time would have been unlawful").
140 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 1987); see also supra note 114 and
accompanying text.
1 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW. § 752(1); see also supra notes 115-16 and accompanying
text.
142 See Soto-Lopez, 713 F. Supp. at 678.
' See id. at 678.
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Also discussed above, the second exception to section 752
permits rejection of an ex-offender's job application when "the
granting of the employment would involve an unreasonable
risk."'" The court in Soto-Lopez assessed the potential risk by
considering the eight factors provided in section 753," and ulti-
mately took the "view that the tasks involved in this position are
[neither 'directly related' to a manslaughter conviction [nor]
present an unreasonable risk to persons or property."4 '
Looking to the second prong of section 752(2) alone, which
permits the rejection of ex-offenders' job applications where they
pose an "unreasonable risk,"" 7 the district court again employed
the eight factors as guides. Ultimately, the court found that,
"the defendants would be exceeding their discretion in conclud-
ing that [an] unreasonable risk existed."'48
V. PROPOSAL
In order to promote public safety, employers should be le-
gally required to ascertain the criminal records of job applicants.
Awareness of these records will allow employers to use the bal-
ancing scheme available in Article 23-A to screen out potentially
violent individuals from public contact.'
Presently, some employers do request references and ask
applicants about their criminal past. However, as demonstrated
in Haddock5 ' and Soto-Lopez, 5' applicants can simply lie, leav-
ing employers unaware. Under current New York negligent
hiring jurisprudence, this ignorance is actually a benefit to em-
ployers because it can provide protection from future liability.
5 2
As a result, members of the public may come into close contact
with violent ex-offenders in situations where they would not
normally expect a threat of harm.' Victims of the resulting
14 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752(2); see also supra text accompanying note 117.
,' See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
"6 Soto-Lopez, 713 F. Supp. at 678-79.
147 See id. at 679.
148 Id.
149 See Part IV for a discussion of New York's statutes regarding the hiring of
ex-offenders.
'10 See Haddock v. New York, 553 N.E.2d 987, 989 (N.Y. 1990).
See Soto-Lopez, 713 F. Supp. at 678.
112 See Part I(1) for a discussion of New York cases holding that actual knowl-
edge is a prerequisite for imposing liability; see also Section 1I(3).
"3See, e.g., Haddock, 553 N.E.2d at 988 (holding the city, as employer, liable for
the rape of a child on a local playground by a Parks Department's employee when
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violence typically have no recourse against employers due to the
employer's ignorance of their employee's propensities."A Re-
quiring employers to obtain criminal records will remove this
shield and allow employers to sift-out dangerous applicants who
are unsuitable for specific positions.
While employers should become aware of criminal records,
the policy in favor of hiring ex-offenders should be maintained. 5
Employers should be aware of criminal records, not so that they
may reject all ex-offenders, but so that they will be able to make
more informed hiring decisions. Blind discrimination against ex-
offenders would likely lead to increased recidivism, 56 which
would frustrate the purpose of this proposal-to promote safety.
Thus, employers should be required to demonstrate compliance
with the guidelines provided in the ex-offender protection laws.
It is recognized that requiring employers to obtain criminal
histories could create a significant burden.57 Additionally, ob-
taining actual knowledge may expose more employers to liability
for negligent hiring.5 8 It is certainly not in New York's interest
to make the cost of doing business any higher. In an attempt to
balance the interests of public safety against those of the busi-
ness community, only larger employers should be required to
comply. Imposing this burden on small employers' time and re-
sources could have a crippling effect. Further, to offset the cost
of requiring employers to familiarize themselves with their em-
ployees' or potential employees' criminal records, an employer li-
ability limit should be set.'59
the city knew of the employee's criminal history); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791 793 (App. Div.) (holding that an unaware
church is not liable for sexual assault of an infant by a priest), cert. denied, 118 U.S.
413 (1997); Detone v. Bullit Courier Serv., Inc.,, 528 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (App. Div.
1988) (holding that a bicycle messenger service unaware of a messenger's prior his-
tory was not liable for messenger's violently striking a pedestrian on the head).
1' See Parts I(1) and (2) for a discussion of New York cases holding that ac-
tual knowledge is a prerequisite for imposition of liability. See, e.g., Detone, 528
N.Y.S.2d at 577-78 (reversing the trial court's finding of negligence and holding that
the defendant did not have notice of employee's violent propensities).
' See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
5 See supra text accompanying note 112.
157 See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text; see also supra note 7 and ac-
companying text (discussing the costs involved in obtaining criminal records).
es See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
... Any dollar amount on the liability limit would be arbitrary. However, the
limit should be high enough so that plaintiffs will receive a meaningful recovery, but
not so high as to strip employers of the benefit of their compliance.
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A recurring issue in negligent hiring decisions is the fear of
creating a "chilling effect" on the employment of ex-offenders."6 °
Courts are concerned that exposing employers to potentially high
jury awards will dqter other employers from hiring ex-
offenders." 1 A liability limit will help alleviate this problem.
With a statutorily prescribed liability limit, courts could more
readily allow negligent hiring cases to proceed to trial without
fear of juries setting extremely high precedents for future
awards.
Liability limits and statutory coverage based on employer
size are concessions that have been made in other areas of em-
ployment law. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to permit com-
pensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional employ-
ment discrimination. 16 2  However, Title VII does not apply to
businesses with fewer than fifteen employees." In addition, 42
U.S.C. § 1981a limits the available compensatory and punitive
damages based on the employer's size.1 4
Liability limits for a defendant's own negligence are applied
in various areas of the law. For example, statutes limit liability
for negligence in the areas of environmental pollution,165 aircraft
"0 See Haddock v. New York, 553 N.E.2d 987, 992 (N.Y. 1990) ("The importance
of employing former inmates, and reintegrating them into society, without risk of
absolute liability for those who open their doors to them, cannot be overstated.");
Ford v. Gildin, 613 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142 (App. Div. 1994) ("Imposing liability upon an
employer under the circumstances presented herein would have an unacceptably
chilling effect on society's efforts to reintegrate ex-offenders into mainstream soci-
ety, contrary to precedent and the explicitly stated public policy of this State.").
161 See Haddock, 553 N.E.2d at 992 ("While municipalities should not have to
fear that they imperil the public [ ] whenever they hire persons with criminal rec-
ords, the narrow ground on which we resolve this appeal should not have the far-
reaching consequence of deterring participation in programs that offer such em-
ployment opportunities."); Ford, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 140; Babi-Ali v. City of New York,
979 F. Supp. 268, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
162 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b)(1994).
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b)(1994).
16 Employers with more than fourteen* employees but fewer than one hundred
and one have their liability capped at $50,000. Large employers, those with more
than five hundred employees, have a $300,000 damages cap. See 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(b) (1994).
'6 See National Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Trade Corp. of Del., 122
F.3d 1062, 1062 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished disposition) (holding that a shipping
corporation's liability for the costs of an oil spill cleanup was limited to $500,000 un-
der the Oil Pollution Act of 1990).
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disasters,'6 medical malpractice, 16 7 and negligent bailment.'6
These limits attempt to balance the interests of plaintiffs against
the threat of defendants' overexposure to liability.
69
In terms of negligent hiring, there are equitable factors in
favor of limiting employer liability. Without Article 23-A, many
employers would likely refuse to hire most ex-offenders in order
to avoid potential problems.' Employers should not face exorbi-
tant damages awards if there has been good faith compliance
with the New York law that supports the hiring of ex-
offenders.'
A liability limit is particularly justifiable in light of the Soto-
Lopez decision.7 2 There, the court held that an applicant's man-
slaughter conviction was not "directly related" to the position
sought because it was not foreseeable that a porter would en-
166 See Saba v. Compagnie Natl Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(recognizing that the liability for transportation of checked baggage and goods is
limited by the Warsaw Convention).
167 See Owen v. United States, 935 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the United States could avail itself of the Louisiana medical malpractice liability cap
statute as a defense).
168 See Goncalves v. Regent Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 58 N.Y.2d 206, 220 (1983) (Jasen,
J., dissenting) (stating that under New York General Business Law section 200, in
exchange for the privilege of using a hotel's safe, liability is normally limited to $500
for lost goods).
16e See id. at 226.
"[Tihe principle purpose underlying the enactment of the statute before us
was to protect hotels from undisclosed excessive liability by requiring
guests who wished to have hotels safeguard property worth in excess of
$500 to disclose the value of such property so that the hotel could take
whatever steps necessary, based upon the value of the property, to assure
its protection."
Id. (citing Millhiser v. Beau Site Co., 251 N.Y. 290 (1929)).
170 See Ford, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 142 (observing that holding an employer negligent
"would effectively compel any employer to deny employment to anyone who was
ever convicted of a violent crime, contrary to the public policy stated in article 23-A
of the Correction Law.").
171 For example, the jury in Haddock awarded $3.5 million to the plaintiff. This
was later reduced to $2.5 million by the Appellate Division. See Haddock v. New
York, 553 N.E.2d 987, 990 (N.Y. 1990); see also Green, supra note 28, at 910-14
(noting the following- "Parent Corporation Ordered to Pay $5,000,000.00 in Dam-
ages for Rape-Murder By Employee;" "Gas Station Customer Gets $100,000 for
Negligent Hiring But Can't Reach Deeper Pockets of Oil Company," "Manufacturer
Awarded Over $300,000.00 Against Pinkerton's For Thefts of Gold by Security
Guard, Despite Inquiry About Employee's Police Record").
172 See Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 713 F. Supp. 677
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also supra notes 132-48 and accompanying text (discussing the
details of the Soto-Lopez decision).
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counter violent confrontations. 7' Under this reasoning, violent
offenders, such as murderers, would only be barred from posi-
tions that contemplate physical conflict, such as a bouncer or a
security guard.' This narrow interpretation of the "directly re-
lated" test undermines the ability of employers to effectively use
Article 23-A in screening applicants. As a result, employers
should not be exposed to unlimited liability when judicial con-
structions appear to restrict their power to fully evaluate the
compatibility of an ex-offender's record with the responsibilities
of the available position.
A general requirement of obtaining criminal records is de-
sirable in light of New York's position on negligent hiring, which
effectively discourages employers from making such an in-
quiry. 7' Currently, employers may claim ignorance of their em-
ployees' criminal histories and thereby effectively bar plaintiffs'
recovery.76 A requirement that employers ascertain employees'
and applicants' criminal records will significantly reduce the ef-
fectiveness of this defense. Although a liability cap may limit
individual recoveries, the proposed approach will allow more
plaintiffs to overcome the currently significant hurdle of estab-
lishing that the employer had notice of the employee's propensity
for violence.
173 See Soto- Lopez, 713 F. Supp. at 679.
174 See id. ("Since the housing caretaker position, unlike a correction officer posi-
tion, for example, would not as such involve plaintiff in violent confrontations and
obviously does not require plaintiff to carry arms, his fitness to perform these duties
is not implicated.").
175 Without either actual or constructive knowledge of an employee's propensity
for violence, employers will not be found liable for negligent hiring. See supra Parts
III(1) - 111(3); see also Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654
N.Y.S.2d 791, 795 (App. Div.) (holding employer not liable for failing to investigate
background of priest), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 413 (1998); Galo v. Dugan, 645
N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (App. Div. 1996) (holding an employer not liable because plaintiff
failed to establish "that the employee had a history of, or propensity for, assaultive
behavior and that even if such was proven, that plaintiff knew or should have
known of such propensity."); Farrell v. McIntosh, 633 N.Y.S.2d 524, 525 (App. Div.
1995) (finding no evidence to support employer liability); Mataxas v. North Shore
Univ. Hosp., 621 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that there was no li-
ability where an employer had no knowledge of an employee's propensity to commit
criminal acts); Rochlin v. Alamo, 619 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (App. Div. 1994) (holding an
employer not negligent in hiring an employee where there was no evidence of the
employee's potential danger); Detone v. Bullit Courier Serv., 528 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577
(App. Div. 1988) (explaining that there is no liability absent evidence that employer
knew that employee might be dangerous).
176 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Public safety concerns mandate that employers become
aware of the criminal histories of their employees. However, be-
cause such a duty would place a significant burden on the busi-
ness community, small employers should be exempt, and em-
ployers falling within the new requirement should have the
benefit of a liability limit. While it may be argued that individ-
ual plaintiffs will suffer from the liability limit, the overall effect
will be that of increased public safety. With employers better in-
formed of whom they are hiring, the chances of putting a dan-
gerous employee into contact with the public will be reduced.
Dermot Sullivan*
* The author would like to thank Professor Janet M. Spencer, Professor of Law,
St. John's University School of Law, for her generous support and guidance in the
development of this Note.
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